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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 09-3131

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TEDDY COPPEDGE,
Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. No. 1-08-cr-00075-001)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 10, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, ROTH, and TASHIMA,* Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 11, 2010)
____
OPINION

*

Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
designation.

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Teddy Coppedge, who pled guilty to charges of being a felon in possession
of a firearm, appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized
during a warrantless search of his automobile. At issue on appeal is whether Coppedge
voluntarily consented to the search. We conclude that the District Court did not clearly err
in finding that he did so consent, and we will accordingly affirm the District Court’s order.
I.
On April 8, 2008, two detectives of the City of Wilmington Police Department
observed Coppedge run a red traffic signal while driving a white Buick. Because both
detectives were dressed in plainclothes and were riding in an unmarked police vehicle,
they started to call for a marked car to come perform the traffic stop. When Coppedge
then parked the car he was driving and began to walk away, the officers decided to stop
him themselves. They put on police vests (with “POLICE” marked across front and
back), stopped Coppedge, handcuffed him, and sat him on the ground. The officers noted
that Coppedge offered no resistance, and that he looked shaken and upset.
One of the officers testified that using handcuffs on Coppedge was necessary to
protect the officers and to prevent him from fleeing. The officer further testified that, at
this point, Coppedge was being detained for the traffic violation and would be free to
leave once the ticket was issued. As part of the traffic stop, one of the officers asked
Coppedge how he had arrived there, to which he replied that he had walked. Coppedge
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then consented to a pat down search, and the officer discovered a Buick key. Coppedge
told the officer that the key belonged to his cousin and that the car was parked in another
part of town; however, after the officer asked him if the key was actually for the white
Buick parked across the street, Coppedge admitted that it was. The officer then asked
Coppedge if there was anything in the car that the officer should know about, to which
Coppedge replied there was a small amount of “bud” (meaning marijuana) in the center
console. App. at 44. The officers then searched the vehicle, observed what appeared to
be marijuana in the center console and found approximately 40 grams of marijuana in the
glove box along with a loaded handgun. Coppedge was placed under arrest and later
indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Coppedge filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence and statements from the
traffic stop and search. The District Court denied this motion, finding that Coppedge had
voluntarily consented to the warrantless search of his automobile and that he had not been
in custody for Miranda purposes. Coppedge then entered a conditional plea of guilty,
reserving his right to appeal the District Court’s adverse ruling on his suppression
motion.1
II.
“We review . . . the denial of the motion to suppress for clear error as to the
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231
and this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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underlying facts, but exercise plenary review as to its legality in light of the district court's
properly found facts.” United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal
quotations and brackets omitted).
Coppedge appeals only the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress the
physical evidence from the automobile search. Therefore, our review is limited to the
Fourth Amendment issues concerning the search, and we need not consider whether
Coppedge was in custody for Fifth Amendment Miranda purposes.
It is well established that police officers may constitutionally conduct a search
without a warrant or probable cause based upon an individual’s voluntary consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). Voluntariness “is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Id. at 227. Evidence
that the consent was induced by police coercion renders the consent invalid. Id. We have
held that “the critical factors comprising a totality of the circumstances inquiry . . .
include[ ] the setting in which the consent was obtained, the parties’ verbal and
non-verbal actions, and the age, intelligence, and educational background of the
consenting [party].” Givan, 320 F.3d at 459.
Applying the totality of the circumstances test to the facts adduced at the
suppression hearing, we conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in determining
that Coppedge voluntarily consented to the search. In his testimony at the suppression
hearing, Officer Riley asserted that Coppedge consented to a search of the Buick by
admitting to lying, acknowledging ownership of the Buick, and admitting that there was
4

marijuana in the car. This assertion was not challenged on cross examination. Even
though Coppedge was handcuffed at the time he gave his consent, the District Court
concluded that this did not constitute a “custodial interrogation” that might render his
consent involuntary, a finding which Coppedge has not challenged on appeal. See United
States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 360 (3d Cir. 2006). In addition, the evidence indicates
his consent was not induced by police coercion: (i) he was seated on a public street, rather
than confined to a police station or police car; (ii) the officers made no promises or
threats to Coppedge; and (iii) there were only two police officers present when consent
was obtained. See Givan, 320 F.3d at 459; United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 954-5 (3d
Cir. 1994).
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling.
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